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Why Environmental Liability Regimes
in the United States, the European
Community, and Japan Have Grown
Synonymous With the Polluter Pays
Principle
ABSTRACT

Significant concern about the harm to the environment
caused by the disposal of hazardous wastes and detrimental
materials abounds. In response, regulators around the globe
have struggled to develop environmental liability regimes that
effectively remediate contaminated sites. Regulators in the
United States, the European Community, and Japan have
addressed environmental contamination concerns by adopting
the polluter pays principle as a core component of their domestic
environmental liability regimes. The polluter pays principle
demands that the polluter bear the burden of remediating the
waste it generates. The impetus for adoption of the polluter pays
principle in the United States, the European Community, and
Japan is somewhat unclear. Certain sources and trends,
however, have likely contributed to and informed the principle's
adoption. These sources include the prevalence of international
treaties, the increasing availability of information concerning
the environment, domestic and foreign laws that influence the
conduct of other countries, nongovernmental organizations that
exert pressure on regulatory bodies, bilateral and multilateral
development institutions that condition their lending practices
on the friendly treatment of the environment, and the growing
standardizationof environmental policies worldwide. This Note
addresses these sources, and explores the manner in which they
have influenced and encouraged the United States, the
European Community, and Japan to embrace the polluter pays
principle as an effective tool to achieve environmental waste
remediation.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Linked by a global communication system, political participants,
advocacy groups, and electorates in economically advanced
democracies are increasingly expressing concern about the same
environmental harms.1 Amidst this concern, regulatory officials,
scientists, legal scholars, and environmental activists are traveling
across borders, in person and electronically, talking about the risks
and policy concerns associated with cleaning up the environment. 2 At
the center of much of their concern is the harm to the environment
that arises from the disposal of hazardous wastes and detrimental
material. Specifically, regulators around the world are contemplating
how contaminated sites should be remediated.
Regulators in the United States, the European Community, and
Japan have responded to this concern by merging the polluter pays
principle into their domestic environmental liability regimes. This
principle suggests that the polluter should bear the cost of abating
waste and restoring the environment to an acceptable condition. By
compelling the polluter to bear the expense, the cost of these clean up
measures is reflected in the cost of the goods and services that
generate the pollution through their production or consumption.
When the price of goods and services reflects their environmental
costs, consumers are not challenged to gather and consider
information concerning a good's or service's effect on the
environment. Rather, because consumers prefer the least expensive
goods and services, the consumer generally makes a decision based on
price alone, in which the social and environmental costs of
contamination are already embedded. Consequently, the polluter
pays principle ensures that the choices made in the self-interest of
the consumer further environmental responsibility.
It is unclear what has encouraged the adoption of the polluter
pays principle in the United States, the European Community, and
Japan. This Note identifies certain of the principal sources that have
contributed to the development and harmonization of environmental
liability regimes in these countries under the polluter pays principle.
These principal sources include the prevalence of international
treaties, the increasing availability of information concerning the
environment, domestic and foreign laws that influence other
countries, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that exert

Robert A. Kagan, The Consequences of Adversarial Legalism, in
1.
REGULATORY ENCOUNTERS 376 (Robert A. Kagan & Lee Axelrad eds., 2000).
Id.
2.
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pressure on regulatory bodies, bilateral and multilateral development
institutions that condition their lending on the friendly treatment of
the environment, and the growing standardization of environmental
policies worldwide.
This Note examines the global convergence of the polluter pays
principle by emphasizing the experiences of the United States, the
European Community, and Japan. Part II provides a background of
the polluter pays principle as a normative doctrine of environmental
policy; it also outlines its history and its current interpretation. Part
III outlines the development of the principle in the United States, the
European Community, and Japan, as well as the framework in which
the principle arose in each country. Part IV highlights the sources
which have arguably been the most influential in encouraging the
United States, the European Community, and Japan to adopt the
polluter pays principle as an effective tool to achieve environmental
waste remediation.

II. THE POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE
"The Polluter Pays principle is a normative doctrine of
environmental law. ' ' 3 Although the principle's precise legal definition
remains difficult to ascertain, the core of the principle derives from
the fundamental, fair, and logical proposition that the parties who
generate pollution, not the government, should bear the cost of
4
abatement.
A. History of the Polluter Pays Principle
The principle first appeared in a legal context in a document
prepared by the international Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD). 5 The document included the following
recommendation:
The principle to be used for allocating costs of pollution prevention and
control measures to encourage rational use of scarce environmental
resources and to avoid distortions in international trade and
investment is the so-called "Polluter Pays principle." This principle
means that the polluter should bear the expenses of carrying out the
above mentioned measures decided by public authorities to ensure that
the environment is in an acceptable state. In other words, the cost of
these measures should be reflected in the costs of goods and services

3.

Jonathan R. Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict Between Tradable Pollution

Allowances and the "PolluterPays"Principle,24 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 466 (2000).
4.
Id.

5.

Environment and Economics: Guiding Principles Concerning International

Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies,Annex
1972), available at 1972 WL 24710.

1, OECD Doc. C(72)128, (May 26,
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which cause pollution in production and/or consumption. Such
measures should not be accompanied by subsidies that would create
6
significant distortions in international trade and investment.

For years, only the OECD recommendation formally documented
the principle. 7 More recently, however, the principle has appeared in
a number of international legal documents addressing issues
surrounding environmental law.8 For instance, the principle played a
significant role in the formation of law and policy in the European
Community. 9 In 1992, as described hereinafter, the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development included the principle
in its Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,' 0 an
"instrument of international jurisprudence [that] articulates policies
and prescriptions directed at the achievement of worldwide
sustainable development."" Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration
provides that "[n]ational authorities should endeavour to promote the
internalization of environmental costs and the use of economic
instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter
should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the
public interest and without distorting international trade and
investment.' 2 The principle's inclusion in one of the most important
and influential international statements of the fundamental
principles of environmental law demonstrates its significance in
environmental liability regimes around the world. 13

6.
Id. 4.
7.
Nash, supra note 3, at 469.
8.
Hans Chr. Bugge, The Principles of "PolluterPays" in Economics and Law,
in LAW AND ECON. OF THE ENV'T 53, 54 (Erling Eide & Roger van den Bergh eds., 1996)
("Reference to the polluter pays principle is found in an increasing number of
international recommendations and treaties." (internal citation omitted)); Ursula
Kettlewell, GATT - Will Liberalized Trade Aid Global Environmental Protection?, 21
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY 55, 55 (1992) ("The polluter-pays principle has been accepted
by the majority of industrialized nations as the mechanism for controlling global
pollution." (internal citations omitted)).
9.
See Isabelle Martin, The Limitations to the Implementation of a Uniform
Environmental Policy in the European Union, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 675, 675-76 (1994)
("The polluter pays principle, which is one of the basic principles of EC environmental
policy, also governs EC State aid policy, and subsidies may be granted to companies for
environmental purposes only in specific circumstances." (internal citations omitted)).
10.
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. AICONF. 151/5/Rev.1 (1992),
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874, 878 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
11.
John Batt & David C. Short, The Jurisprudenceof the 1992 Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development: A Law, Science, and Policy Explication of Certain
Aspects of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 8 J. NAT.
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 229, 230 (1993).
12.
Rio Declaration,supra note 10, at 879.
13.
Nash, supra note 3, at 471.
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While domestic law in the United States has never codified the
principle, 14 the principle has informed the evolution of environmental
law in the United States. 15 Certain provisions of the 1970 Clean Air
Act (CAA) 16 and the 1977 Clean Water Act (CWA) 17 require polluters
to satisfy environmental standards at their own expense.18 The
Compensation and
Environmental Response,
Comprehensive
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) assigns liability for costs associated
with cleaning up sites contaminated by hazardous wastes. 19 CERCLA
20
was patterned on, and attempts to fulfill, the polluter pays principle
likely
by imposing liability for cleanup costs on those parties that2 are
1
responsible for the underlying pollution and contamination.
B. Interpretationsof the Principle
Clear contours and boundaries of the polluter pays principle
remain unclear. 22 A number of interpretations have been articulated,
and the principle can reflect different meanings in different
contexts. 23 The OECD recommendation described above, for example,

Id.
14.
15.
See Sanford E. Gaines, The Polluter-PaysPrinciple:From Economic Equity
to Environmental Ethos, 26 TEX. INT'L L.J. 463, 480 (1991) ("The United States, in
contrast to the European nations, does not officially recognize the [polluter pays
principle] as a distinct principle or policy mandate, but does, by natural political and
economic inclination, closely follow its precepts in practice." (internal citations
omitted)).
16.
Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994 & Supp. III 1997)) [hereinafter CAA].
Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977) (codified
17.
as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
18.
See, e.g., CAA, supra note 16, § 7502.
19.
See generally Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980, § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994) (identifying parties potentially
responsible for CERCLA liability costs).
20.

See REPORT OF THE HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT

OF THE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION, ADMINISTRATION OF THE
FEDERAL SUPERFUND PROGRAM, H.R. DOc. No. 103-55, at 12 (1993); J. Whitney
Pesnell, The ContributionBar in CERCLA Settlements and Its Effect on the Liability of
Nonsettlors, 58 LA. L. REV. 167, 190 (1997) (the polluter pays principle is "one of the
central objectives or goals of CERCLA.").
See CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994).
21.
See JAMES BRIAN McLOUGHLIN & E.G. BELLINGER, ENVIRONMENTAL
22.
POLLUTION CONTROL 145 (1993) ("There is no agreed definition of the term 'polluter
pays principle,' . . . nor of any precisely defined scope of its application, nor of any clear
agreement on permissible exceptions."); Alan E. Boyle, Economic Growth and
Protection of the Environment: The Impact of International Law and Policy, in
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 173, 180 (Alan E. Boyle ed.,

1994) (speaking of "continuing evolution in the scope and definition of the principle
which differing formulations in OECD recommendations and later instruments have
not entirely clarified.").
See Bugge, supra note 8, at 53 ('The so-called 'polluter pays principle' .
23.
has several meanings." (internal citations omitted)). Professor Bugge has identified
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is essentially economic in nature. 24 The recommendation can be
viewed as requiring only that the government not subsidize polluters
or pollution costs.

25

Over time, however, interpretations of the principle have tended
to shift beyond this foundation. 26 Considering the global nature of
pollution issues, the predominant view is no longer that governments
merely determine the degree to which abatement and residual
pollution costs should be internalized. 27 Instead, a growing number of
scholars believe that governments should demand the internalization
of costs by polluters that achieves the "optimal level of pollution." 28
Distortions in international trade and investment arising from
differential pollution abatement financing methods could be
eliminated through the adoption of the polluter pays principle. 29 This
would occur because the polluter pays principle furthers "procedural
integration by providing private decision-makers with a simple
means of considering a great deal of information." 30 Without the
principle, "private actors could ignore social and environmental costs,
making decisions based simply on price."31 More conscientious
decision makers would be forced to undertake the overwhelming
"tasks of gathering information about social and environmental costs
and then weigh[ing] those costs against the economic price of goods
and services ....

When the price of goods and services reflects their

environmental and social costs, however, these separate tasks are

four versions of the polluter pays principle that have found expression in various
manners:
(1) the principle is an economic principle; a principle of efficiency; (2) the
principle is a legal principle; a principle of "just" distribution of costs; (3) the
principle is one of international harmonization of national environmental
policy; and (4) the principle is a principle of allocation of costs between states.

Id.
See Note on the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle, OECD Jan.
24.
21, 1974, 14 I.L.M. 238, 239 (1975) ("[T]he Polluter-Pays Principle is no more than an
efficiency principle for allocating costs...."); Bugge, supra note 8, at 55 ("The early
discussions on the polluter pays principle in OECD were based on theories of
environmental economics, and the problems of internalization of environmental
costs.").
See Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the
25.
Debate, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 459, 506 (1994) ("Despite its name, the [polluter pays
principle] does not really call for polluters to pay anything. It is a procedural injunction
to governments." (internal citations omitted)).
Gaines, supra note 15, at 482-85.
26.
Nash, supra note 3, at 475.
27.
28.
Id.
Charles S. Pearson, Testing the System: GATT + PPP ?, 27 CORNELL INT'L
29.
L.J. 553, 555 (1994).
30.
John C. Dernbach, Sustainable Development as a Framework for National
Governance, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 60 (1998).
Id.
31.

2005]
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unnecessary." 32 "Because decision makers prefer the least expensive
goods and services when given a choice among goods and services of
comparable quality, the polluter pays principle makes it more likely
that the choices they make in their self-interest also will further
33
"The
sustainable development" and environmental responsibility.
34
well.
as
integration
substantive
furthers
[principle] thus
1. Equitable Side of the Principle
Current interpretations of the principle introduce an equitable

side of the principle as well.3 5 These interpretations contend not only
that the government should not bear the abatement costs, but also
that the specific polluters should incur the responsibility for abating

their contribution to a particular pollution problem.3 6 This "strong
approach" 37 demands that polluters internalize at least the pollution
abatement expenses, a requirement that Professor Nash calls

"equitable internalization." 38

"Equitable internalization

allocates

abatement costs and the costs of residual pollution among polluters

and between polluters and victims."3 9 If, for example, a single factory
discharges waste into a river that affects a farmer downstream,
''equitable internalization calls for the proper apportionment of the
costs of abatement and of residual pollution between the factory and
40
the farmer-with the polluter bearing these costs.

32.
Id.
33.
Id.
34.
Id.
Dernbach, supra note 30; see also McLOUGHLIN & BELLINGER, supra note
35.
22, at 151 ("The United States favours interpretation of the [polluter pays] principle in
'equity terms,' , , , as distinct from the criterion of efficiency."); Daniel C. Esty, Toward
Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495, 1504 (1999) ("In addition
to . . .economic efficiency considerations, fundamental fairness and the protection of
property also require that polluters pay for or abate their own emissions ....").
Nash, supra note 3, at 476; see also Gaines, supra note 15, at 470
36.
("[L]awyers have interpreted the economic [polluter pays principle] as a requirement
that polluters should pay all the social and economic costs of their conduct.").
See David A. Wirth, The Rio Declarationon Environment and Development:
37.
Two Steps Forwardand One Back, or Vice Versa?, 29 GA. L. REV. 599, 643 (1995).
Rio Principle 16 ...appears to state an affirmative and original 'strong' form of
the Polluter-Pays Principle that directs governments to assure the
internalization of environmental costs through the use of economic
instruments, not merely to refrain from subsidizing the purchase and use of
pollution control equipment by private industry.
Id.
38.
39.
40.

Nash, supra note 3, at 477.

Id.
Id.
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2. Extensions of the Principle in the Multiple Polluter Context
Some interpretations of the principle embrace two additional
extensions, which are "applicable to pollution created, and
contributed to, by multiple polluters." 41 First, if a pollution problem
arises because of the aggregate conduct and emissions of multiple
42
polluters, the "equitable internalization" doctrine must be refined.
Here, equitable internalization addresses the proper allocation of
costs among the multiple polluters. 43 Equitable internalization would
prefer to apportion the costs according to each polluter's
44
responsibility for the aggregate problem.
Second, it is often difficult to identify the particular victims of
multiple polluter conduct. 45 Here, the government resides as the
proxy for the "victimized society," particularly because the
government bears the responsibility and expense of remediating the
pollution's effects. 46 Therefore, pursuant to the polluter pays
principle, each individual polluter should internalize the cost of
residual pollution by compensating the government for its expenses
47
in remediating the problems that the polluter caused.

III. THE FRAMEWORK AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLLUTER PAYS
PRINCIPLE IN THE UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, AND
JAPAN

It is difficult to recognize and make sense of the convergence of
environmental liability regimes in the United States, the European
Community, and Japan under the polluter pays principle without
first considering the framework in which the principle arose in each
country. In particular, this section highlights each region's adoption
of the polluter pays principle, which is arguably one of the basic
standards that has informed the development of each country's
environmental liability regime.

41.

Id. at 478.

42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 477.

45.

Id.

46.

Id.

47.

Id.; see also WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 180, (2d ed. 1988) (asserting that, under the polluter pays
principle, "society's environmental resources, including clear air and water,... belong
to the public at large. Those who 'use' these resources must then compensate the
owners (i.e., the public) for any environmental degradation that occurs.").

20051

THE EMERGENCE OF THE POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE

551

A. The United States and CERCLA Regulation
CERCLA was enacted to provide the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) with a set of tools to effect hazardous waste cleanup. 48
These tools include a stringent liability regime, strengthened by the
federal courts, 49 that assigns cleanup expenses to nearly any
landowner, disposal operator, transporter, or generator of hazardous
waste associated with a polluted site. 50 This stringent liability regime
is synonymous with the polluter pays principle. 51 CERCLA also
includes a provision empowering the EPA to order private party
cleanups, with the potential of subjecting recalcitrants to treble
damages. 5 2 Furthermore, the EPA is authorized to employ a number
of conciliation devices and incentives to generate private party
cooperation, including (1) the use of alternative dispute resolution
procedures, (2) permitting the government to bear certain cleanup
expenses, and (3) assigning proportionate shares of responsibility3
5
among "Potentially Responsible Parties" (PRPs) at multiparty sites.
The EPA discovers and remedies hazardous waste sites with federal
funds that are designated for cleanup, commonly known as the
54
Superfund.
1. Administration of the Polluter Pays Principle by the EPA
The EPA relies on a number of implementation schemes in the
administration of these enforcement mechanisms under the polluter
pays principle and the Superfund Program. 55 First, the EPA has
discretion in the degree to which it uses coercion to compel
cooperation, ranging from accommodation to prosecution. 56 Second,
the efforts of the EPA are enhanced by its reliance on strong legal

48.
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1980).
49.
See, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio
1983); see generally W. Wilkerson & T.W. Church, The Gorilla in the Closet: Joint and
Several Liability and the Cleanup of Toxic Waste Sites, 11 LAW & POL'Y 425 (1989).

50.
51,

42 U.S.C. § 9607.
T. Church & R. Nakamura, Beyond Superfund: Hazardous Waste Cleanup

in Europe and the United States, 7 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 15, 24-25 (1994).

52.
42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (authorizing the EPA to order private party cleanups);
42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3) (authorizing the award of treble damages against recalcitrant
private parties).
53.
42 U.S.C. § 9622.
54.
26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1993) (establishing the Hazardous Substance Superfund);
42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (1994) (defining the uses of the Superfund). "Superfund" is used to
refer to the entire Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980, as well as to refer to the Hazardous Substance Superfund.
55.

T. CHURCH & R. NAKAMURA, CLEANING UP THE MESS: IMPLEMENTATION

STRATEGIES IN SUPERFUND (The Brookings Institution ed., 1993).
56.
Id.
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doctrines and administrative powers to compel responsible parties
57
bear most or all of the costs of remediation under the principle.
Since the adoption of the Superfund program in 1980, the EPA
has generally used what the Agency calls an "enforcement first"
approach, which emphasizes the coercive tools at the Agency's
disposal. 58 The two primary tenets of this approach are the legal
doctrine of strict joint-and-several liability and the EPA's authority to
tender unilateral administrative orders to compel cleanup using the
59
threat of treble damages.
2. Functional Application of the Polluter Pays Principle
The U.S.'s environmental liability regime under CERCLA
defines "polluter" broadly. PRPs at a polluted site can be owners of
the polluted site, operators of disposal facilities residing on the
polluted site, generators of any hazardous wastes discovered at the
polluted site, and transporters of the waste.6 0 The liability of
polluters is strict, which means that no negligence or fault need be
found to hold the polluter legally responsible for the cleanup
expenses. Liability under CERCLA is also retroactive, meaning that
it can attach to conduct that occurred before the passage of CERCIA
in 1980.61
The amount of damages paid by any of these parties included
under CERCLA's broad definition of "polluter" (the "pays" element of
the polluter pays principle) is also broad in Superfund actions. Courts
have determined that liability under CERCLA is "joint and several,"
which allows a claimant to hold any single responsible party liable for
all of the cleanup expense, irrespective of that party's actual
contribution to the aggregate contamination.6 2 While the availability
of joint-and-several liability does not necessarily mean that liability
will fall on just one party at a multiparty site, it does allow the EPA
to chase those with "deep pockets," regardless of their level of
63
contribution to the contamination.
The broad embrace of the polluter pays principle also plays a
significant role in the negotiation of Superfund cases in the United

57.

Id.

Church & Nakamura, supra note 51, at 23.
58.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (establishment of strict, joint and several liability); id.
59.
§ 9606(a) (establishment of the EPA's authority to compel cleanup); id. § 9607
(authorizing the award of treble damages against recalcitrant parties).
60.
Id. § 9607(a).

61.

Id. § 9607.

62.

See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio

1983).
See CHURCH & NAKAMURA, supra note 55, at 43-143 (addressing the EPA's
63.
strategy of chasing deep pocket defendants).
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States. Church and Nakamura have identified three important roles.
First, CERCLA and court determinations have identified a number of
potential defendants in Superfund cases, which allows the EPA to
proceed selectively against the PRPs against whom it has the
strongest case and who have the requisite resources to pay for site
remediation.6 4 Second, the broad reach of CERCLA liability allows for
the collection of 100 percent of the cleanup costs at sites where at
least one "deep pocket" PRP is identifiable. 65 Third, the nearly
undefeatable legal posture of the government promotes inflexibility in
its negotiating position vis-a-vis the defendants in CERCLA liability
66
actions.
3. Cleaning Up Superfund Sites Under the Polluter Pays Principle
The EPA uses four methods to compel the polluter to pay for the
expenses for the cleanup of a Superfund site. First, the EPA can
perform the cleanup work itself and subsequently sue one or more of
the PRPs in a cost recovery action. 67 Second, the EPA can sue
identified PRPs in advance of the cleanup process, obtain a judgment
of liability against the PRP, and then force the PRP to perform the
cleanup work or ensure that costs in a subsequent governmentfinanced cleanup will be recovered pursuant to the judgment. 68 Third,
the EPA can issue a unilateral administrative order to force liable
parties to remediate the site, and if the liable parties do not comply
with the order and the EPA conducts the cleanup itself, the penalty
rendered can be treble damages. 69 Fourth, the EPA and the PRPs can
negotiate a voluntary cleanup agreement, and the government can

64.
Church & Nakamura, supra note 51, at 25; see generally CHURCH &
NAKAMURA, supra note 55.
65.
Church & Nakamura, supra note 51, at 25; see also CHURCH & NAKAMURA,
supra note 55, at 164.

66.
67.

Church & Nakamura, supra note 51, at 25.
42 U.S.C. § 9604. For a general discussion of this topic, see Lautenberg-

DurenbergerReport on Superfund Implementation: Cleaning Up the Nation's Cleanup
Program: Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Superfund, Ocean and Water
Protection, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H. BARNETT, ToxIC DEBTS AND THE
SUPERFUND DILEMMA (1994); CENTER FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT (ILLINOIS
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY), COALITION ON SUPERFUND REPORT (1989); CLEAN SITES,
IMPROVING REMEDY SELECTION: AN EXPLICIT AND INTERACTIVE PROCESS FOR THE
SUPERFUND PROGRAM (1990); ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, ET. AL., RIGHT TRAIN,
WRONG TRACK: FAILED LEADERSHIP IN THE SUPERFUND CLEANUP PROGRAM (1988); D.
MAZMANIAN & D. MORELL, BEYOND SUPERFAILURE: AMERICA'S TOXIC POLICY FOR THE
1990S (1992); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COMING CLEAN: SUPERFUND'S
PROBLEM'S CAN BE SOLVED (1989); THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, ELI DRAFT
ENFORCEMENT REPORT (1989).

68.
69.

42 U.S.C. § 9607.
Id.
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either implicitly or explicitly use coercive alternatives if the parties
70
do not reach an agreement.
4. The Bottom Line on the United States' Environmental Liability
Regime and the Polluter Pays Principle
The four methods used to clean up Superfund sites are
complementary in practice. 71 Despite the coercive posture of this
liability regime, the government generally uses the voluntary
agreement
option because
it decreases
enforcement
and
administrative costs and also reduces the EPA's role in the site
remediation process to supervising the cleanup process. 72 The EPA's
generally preferred strategy of working with PRPs is to use its formal
coercive powers-the certainty of cost recovery, its unilateral
administrative order powers, and its strong legal position in any
liability action-to nudge targeted, liable parties into a voluntary
73
cleanup agreement according to the polluter pays principle.
These voluntary cleanup agreements, however, can arise from
contentious negotiations. 74 Considering the cost of cleaning up a
Superfund site-with cleanup costs estimated by the EPA in 1991 at
more than $15.2 billion-the sizeable transaction costs involved in a
defendant's resistance to the EPA's demands are slight in comparison
75
with the enormous costs associated with satisfying EPA demands.
Although the expectation of prevailing in such resistance is minimal,
particularly in light of CERCLA's incredibly strong joint and several
liability regime, some argue that a defendant's resistance at least
postpones the foreseeable outcome, perhaps to a time when Congress
or the courts will modify the liability regime. 76 Further, defendants
77
often file third party suits against other deep-pocket PRPs.
Consequently, the significant cost that society incurs in terms of
increased litigation and delays in the remediation of Superfund sites
78
is an additional outcome of the Superfund program.

70.
71.

42 U.S.C. § 9622.
Church & Nakamura, supra note 51, at 26.

72.

Id.; see also Joel A. Mintz, Agencies, Congress and Regulatory Enforcement:

A Review of EPA's Hazardous Waste Enforcement Effort, 1970-1987, 18 ENVTL. L. 683

(1988).
73.
74.

Church & Nakamura, supra note 51, at 26.
Id. at 27.
75.
See J. PAUL ACTION ET. AL., SUPERFUND AND TRANSACTION COSTS: THE
EXPERIENCE OF INSURERS AND VERY LARGE INDUSTRIAL FIRMS (1992); see also L. DIXON,
D.S. DREZNER ET. AL., PRIVATE-SECTOR CLEANUP EXPENDITURES AND TRANSACTION

COSTS at 18 SUPERFUND SITES (1992).
76.
See Church & Nakamura, supra note 51, at 28.
77.
Id.
78.
Id.

20051

THE EMERGENCE OF THE POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE

555

Despite more than two decades of expensive litigation and
administrative confusion, however, it should be emphasized that the
Superfund program and the adoption of the polluter pays principle as
a remediation tool have generated cleanup activities at many of the
major toxic waste sites in the United States. 79 Although the EPA has
expended substantial public funds, many commentators argue that
the availability of private funds under the polluter pays principle
increases efforts to clean up Superfund sites and allows more
protective and permanent remedies to be used than would be
available with public resources alone. 80
B. The European Community: Embracinga Framework for Polluter
Liability
The European Community has grown equally clear in its call for
the adoption and implementation of the polluter pays principle.8 1 The
European Community is calling on those responsible for pollution to
bear the abatement costs, declaring that "environmental protection
should not in principle depend on policies which rely on grants or aid
'8 2
and place the burden of combating pollution on the Community.
The European Community believes that allocating environmental
waste abatement costs to the private sector will force market prices to
represent more closely the social costs of production. 8 3 This, in turn,
will tend to encourage pollution abatement "by reducing the
' '8 4
consumption of pollution intensive products.
The European Commission (hereinafter the Commission) moved
forward in the development of the Community's environmental
liability regime by adopting a White Paper that addresses
environmental liability.8 5 One of the goals of the White Paper is to
determine how the polluter pays principle, the key environmental
principle in the European Community, can best be used to promote
86
the Community's environmental policy.

79.
Id. at 29; see The Clinton Administration'sProposalfor Superfund Reform:
Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources and Environment Comm. on Public
Works and Transportation, U.S. House of Representatives, at 2 (June 9, 1994)
(Statement by Carol M. Browner, Administrator, EPA) (Cleanup was complete at more
than 220 sites, and another 1,100 were in various stages of remediation. In addition,
3,500 emergency removal actions at 2,700 different sites were completed.).
80.
See, e.g., Church & Nakamura, supranote 51, at 29.
81.
Pearson, supra note 29, at 555.
82.
Council Recommendation of 3 March 1975 Regarding Cost Allocation and
Action by Public Authorities on Environmental Matters, 1975 O.J. (L 194).
83.
Pearson, supra note 29, at 555.
84.
Id.
85.
European Commission on the Environment, White Paper on Environmental
Liability, COM(2000) 66 final, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/
liability/white-paper.htm [hereinafter White Paper].
86.
Id. at 2-3.
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1.
Developing the Polluter
Environmental Liability Regimes

Pays

Principle

in

European

To date, each Member State of the European Union maintains a
national environmental liability regime that covers damages to
persons and goods. 8 7 These national regimes do not, however, address
the issue of liability for damage to land, which is a primary reason
why economic actors in the European Community merely concentrate
on their obligations with respect to the health and property of others
rather than on their responsibilities concerning the wider natural
environment.88 The wider natural environment has traditionally been
considered a "public good" for which society in general should remain
responsible, rather than a resource that individual parties should
bear the responsibility for maintaining.8 9 The introduction of strict
liability under the polluter pays principle for polluters of the
environment, as proposed in the White Paper, is expected to generate
more preventative and cautious conduct on the part of economic
actors concerning the unprotected environment. 90
Discussion on the topic ensued in May 1993, when the
Commission published its Green Paper on Remedying Environmental
Damage. 91 In response, more than 100 comments were submitted,
and Parliament and the Commission held a Joint Public Hearing in
November 1993.92 "In April 1994, the European Parliament adopted a
Resolution, calling on the Commission to submit 'a proposal for a
directive on civil liability in respect of [future] environmental
damage.' 9 3 Since that time, the issue of environmental liability has
arisen before the Parliament on a number of occasions. 94 A
comprehensive opinion on the Green Paper was issued by the
Economic and Social Committee on February 23, 1994; it supported
the Commission's potential role in developing an environmental
liability regime in Europe under the polluter pays principle. 9 5 In
early 1997, the Commission determined that a White Paper on
environmental liability and the polluter pays principle should be

87.
Id. at 2.
88.
Id.
89.
Id.
90.
Id.
91.
Communication of 14 May 1993 presented to the Council, the Parliament
and the Economic and Social Committee, COM(93)47 final.
92.
See White Paper, supra note 85, at 9.
93.
Id. (citing European Parliament Resolution of April 20, 1994 O.J. (C
128/165)).
94.
Id. at 10.
95.
Id.
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prepared, and it began doing so in consultation with Member States,
96
national experts, and interested parties.
2.
The Polluter Pays Principle in the European
Environmental Liability Regime and Its Anticipated Effects

Union's

The Commission asserts that codifying an environmental
liability regime represents a way of implementing the main principles
of environmental policy enshrined in the European Community
Treaty, Article 174(2), which emphasizes the Polluter Pays
principle. 97 The Commission's primary objective, then, focuses on
98
ensuring that the polluter liable for the damage pays for the harm.
The Commission opines that if liable polluters are required to pay for
the remediation of their damage, they will reduce their polluting at
least to the point where the marginal cost of abatement exceeds the
compensation avoided. 99 Consequently, a polluter pays environmental
liability regime should result in the prevention of further damage and
in the internalization of environmental costs by the polluter
himself.'0 0 Furthermore, the Commission expects the polluter pays
principle to lead to more precaution, resulting in the avoidance of risk
and damage, as well as generating additional investment in research
and development to improve knowledge and technologies. 01'
3.
What Might the Polluter Pays Principle Cover Under the
European Union's Environmental Liability Regime?
The Commission has approached the scope of the regime from
two different perspectives: "first, the types of damage to be covered,
10 2
and second, the activities, resulting in such damage, to be covered.'
Above all, environmental damage should be covered by the new
environmental liability regime.' 0 3 Environmental damage constitutes
harm caused by activities that are considered harmful to the
environment, or damage that is caused by effects that result in
traditional damage to the environment, i.e., pollution of air or
l
water. 04
The Commission also proposes that the environmental liability
regime cover damage to health and property, damage that it calls

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 11.
at 9.
at 11-12.
at 12.
at 14.
at 9.
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"traditional damages.' 10 5 The Commission argues that if the
traditional damage is caused by a dangerous activity, it is often
caused by the same event that causes environmental damage.' 0 6 The
Commission is concerned that if only environmental damage were
covered by the new environmental liability regime and traditional
damage were left entirely to the Member States, inequitable results
might arise.10 7 For instance, remedies might be much less available
for health damage than for environmental damage caused by the
same event. Moreover, human health is an important policy objective
in its own right and is closely connected with environmental
protection: Article 174(1) of the European Community Treaty states
that the Community's policy concerning the environment shall
contribute to the pursuit of protecting human health.' 0 8
Nearly all national environmental liability regimes strive to
cover activities that carry an inherent risk of causing damage to the
environment.' 0 9 Many of these activities are currently covered by
Community
environmental
legislation." 0
The
Commission
determined that to be the most effective, the new environmental
liability regime in the European Community should be linked to the
relevant European Community legislation on protection of the
environment.'
If the current European Community legislation does
not cover environmental protection, the new environmental liability
regime will ensure restoration and encourage compliance with
national laws that implement European Community environmental
112
legislation.
The Commission proposes that the new environmental liability
regime cover, and the polluter pays principle apply to, the following
categories of European Community legislation: legislation that
governs discharge or emission limits for hazardous substances into
water or air; legislation addressing dangerous substances and
preparation with a view to protecting the environment; legislation
designed to prevent and control the risks of accidents and pollution;
legislation regulating the production, handling, treatment, recovery,
recycling, reduction, storage, transport, trans-frontier shipment, and
disposal of hazardous and other waste; and legislation in the field of
3
the transportation of hazardous substances."

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 15.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 15-16.
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4. The Type of Liability Under the Polluter Pays Principle
The Commission notes that fault-based liability' 14 may appear
more economically efficient than strict liability because fault-based
liability prevents abatement costs from exceeding the benefits of the
resultant reduced environmental pollution. 115 But, recent national
and international environmental liability regimes are based on the
principle of strict liability because the achievement of environmental
cleanup pursuant to the polluter pays principle is better accomplished
this way. 116 One of the primary reasons for the increased opportunity
for achievement is that it is very difficult for plaintiffs to establish
fault on the part of the defendant in an environmental liability
case. 117 Furthermore, the Commission argues, the polluter pays
principle demands that the actor whose conduct is inherently
dangerous to the environment bear the risk of damage caused by
their conduct, rather than the victim of the damage or society at
118
large.
5.
The Bottom Line on the European Union's Environmental
Liability Regime and the Polluter Pays Principle
The introduction of liability for damage to the environment, as
proposed by the White Paper, is expected to generate a change of
attitude in the European Community that should result in an
increased level of prevention and precaution. 119 The new
environmental liability regime aims at making the polluter pay for
remediating the damage that he has caused. 12 0 Environmental
regulation aims at establishing norms and procedures through which
the environment is preserved, and it will allow the European
Community to challenge potential polluters to comply, or to restore
and compensate for, the damage that they have caused according to
1 21
the polluter pays principle.

114.
Fault based liability applies when an operator's conduct is intentionally
wrongful, is negligent, or is without sufficient care. Id. at 16 n.10. Such an act, or
omission, may involve non compliance with legal standards or with the conditions of a
permit, or may occur in any other form. Id.
115.
Id. at 16.
116.
See White Paper, supranote 85, at 9.
117.
Id.
118.
Id.
119.
Id. at 2.
120.

Id. at 11.

121.

Id.
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C. Japan'sEnvironmental Liability Regime: The "FourMajor
Lawsuits"
Like the emergence of liability regimes in the United States,
Japan began to develop a comprehensive environmental liability
regime in the 1970s. 122 The primary shortcoming of the early
Japanese liability regime was that it often failed to protect the
environment and citizens from contamination. 123 Japan has made
improvements during the past twenty years, however, through a
series of court cases known as the "four major lawsuits" that
embraced the polluter pays principle as an environmental waste
1 24
remediation tool.
1. The Japanese Environmental Liability Scheme
The Japanese environmental liability scheme includes two
different methods through which individuals may recover. First, the
Japanese Civil Code includes common law tort provisions, which
entitle individuals to file actions to compel the polluter to bear the
responsibility of eliminating waste to the environment. 125 Second,
Japanese environmental pollution laws establish standards that
permit third party claims to be filed in the event that an injury has
resulted from a violation of the environmental laws. 126 Neither
alternative imposes a limit on the potential award, and both allow for
strict liability and joint-and-several liability under the polluter pays
127
principle.
While the national government of Japan generally articulates
the policies, standards, and goals to be achieved through
environmental laws, local governments are responsible for enforcing
and implementing the laws. 128 The fifty-two prefectures in the

122.

ELGA BARTSCH, LIABILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES: INCENTIVES FOR

PRECAUTION AND RISK ALLOCATION 9 (Mohr Siebeck ed., 1998).
123.
Mary Elliott Rol16, Note, Unraveling Accountability: Contesting Legal and
Procedural Barriers in International Toxic Tort Cases, 15 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV.
135, 151 (2003).
124.
Id. (quoting MINP6, art. 709 (1898)(Japan)).
125.
See BARTSCH, supra note 122, at 14.
126.
See id. ("Liability payments for third-party damages can be claimed under
Art. 709 of the Japanese civil code.").
127.
See Roll6, supra note 123, at 151-52.
128.
George F. Curran III, Pacific Rim Environmental Regulation: A Western
Perspective of Several Countries' Environmental Liability Laws, 3 J. INT'L L. & PRAC.
47, 51 (1994).

20051

THE EMERGENCE OF THE POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE

country manage
129
standards.

and

monitor

compliance

with

561

environmental

2. Flexible Negotiating Process
Although the polluter pays principle imposes penalties for failing
to comply with Japan's environmental laws, the Japanese
government has traditionally induced compliance through a flexible
130
and cooperative negotiating process that occurs at the local level.
Local governments are empowered to regulate environmental matters
by executing private pollution control contracts with potential
polluters that reside in their community. 13 1 Because Japan has
embraced the polluter pays philosophy of environmental liability,
business owners are encouraged to execute private pollution control
agreements with their local governmental units to promote a
reduction in pollution levels below the proscribed levels. 132 Japan's
environmental laws also require businesses to submit yearly reports
to their local governments, articulating their pollution prevention
13 3
plans.
The flexibility of Japan's negotiating process is most evident in
the articulation of the country's goal-oriented emission standards.
Rather than demanding particular technology-based standards or the
use of particular pollution control techniques to achieve
environmental standards, as is the practice in the United States, the
Japanese system permits industry to select its own method of
134
complying with environmental standards.
3. The Polluter Pays Principle and the Four Major Lawsuits
Although interactive cooperation between the government and
industry remains the primary means of ensuring compliance with
environmental laws in Japan, civil litigation drawing on the polluter
pays principle, as well as tort theories of liability, have proved
influential in achieving implementation of environmental standards,
as well as compliance with those standards. 135 Most notably, four
public pollution cases were litigated and resolved in favor of the

129.
130.

Id.
Id. at 52.

131.

Id.

132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id.
Curran, supra note 128.
Id. at 53; see also Nobuo Kumamoto, Recent Tendencies and Problems of

Court Cases on Environmental Protection in Japan, in

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND

POLICY IN THE PACIFIC BASIN AREA 6 (Ichiro Kato et. al. eds., 1981).
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plaintiffs in the early 1970s. 136 The cases were personal injury and
137
nuisance actions that resulted in awards exceeding V1.3 billion.
From this series of litigation also emerged a joint liability doctrine,
whereby each defendant can be held jointly and severally liable for
damages caused by its operation or business, even if there is no direct
causal link between a harmful discharge from the defendant's
138
operation or business and the injuries sustained by the plaintiffs.
Consequently, the polluter pays principle has attained primary
importance in the enforcement of Japan's environmental liability
regime.
4. Injunctive Relief
Japan also permits injunctive causes of action to prevent the
environment from being injured as a complement to the strength of
the polluter pays principle. 139 Injunctive suits in Japan are typically
limited to those cases in which there is a probability that the
defendant may injure the plaintiff "beyond the limitation of
endurance.' 140 Japanese tribunals have considered the following
factors in determining whether an injunctive suit should proceed:
(1) the probability of the character and degree of interests which will
be infringed; (2) the standards set in public laws to regulate
discharges; (3) the degree of consideration of the opinions stated in
the hearings by persons who will be adversely affected; (4) the extent
of the exchange of opinions concerning the disposition for
compensation and monitoring system for pollution; (5) the
thoroughness of effort to identify the best alternative possible to the
challenged conduct; (6) the social value and character of publicity
about the challenged conduct; (7) the degree and character of injuries
caused to the defendant by granting an injunction; and (8) the
14 1
financial responsibility and investigative ability of the defendant.

136.
[1] Toyama District Court, Showa 46 (1971) 6.30, 22 Kasai Minsha
Bessatsu 1 (No. 5.6 (1971)); Nagoya High Court, Kanazawa Branch, Showa 47 (1972),
8.9, 674 Hunrei Jiho 25 (1971); [2] Niigati District Court, Showa 46 (1971), 9.29., 22
Kasai Minshu Bessatsu 1 (No. 5.6); [3] Tsu District Court, Yokkaichi Branch, Showa 47
(1972), 7.24, 23 Kasai Minshu Bessatsu 1 (No. 7) (1972); [4] Kumamoto District Court,
Showa 48 (1973), 3.20, 696 Hanrei Jiho 15 (1973).
137.
See Curran, supra note 128, at 53.
138.
Id.
139.
Id.
140.
See Kumamoto, supra note 135.
141.
See Curran, supranote 128, at 55-56.
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5. The Bottom Line on Japan's Environmental Liability Regime and
the Polluter Pays Principle
In November 1993, the Fundamental Act for Environment went
into effect in Japan, prescribing basic environmental protection
standards that the Japanese government should pursue, as well as
accounting for modern global developments in environmental laws,
including the polluter pays principle. 142 Japan's recent pursuit of a
more effective environmental liability regime under the polluter pays
principle represents a new step toward the pursuit of comprehensive
environmental protection in Japan, which closely resembles the
environmental liability regimes in the United States and in the
143
Member States of the European Community.

IV. WHY HAVE ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY REGIMES IN THE UNITED
STATES, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, AND JAPAN CONVERGED UNDER

THE POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE?

Part III of this Note illustrates the emerging similarities among
the environmental liability regimes of the United States, the
European Community, and Japan. This alignment of the polluter
pays principle has arguably been inspired by a number of sources,
representing the diverse cultures, political agendas, human agendas,
1 44
economic goals, and environmental goals of different countries.
This section identifies and examines what are arguably the principal
sources that have contributed to the development and harmonization
of environmental liability regimes in the United States, the European
Community, and Japan under the polluter pays principle. These
sources include international treaties, the increasing availability of
material information concerning the environment, domestic and
organizations, bilateral and
foreign laws, nongovernmental
growing
and
the
institutions,
development
multilateral
standardization of environmental policies worldwide.
A. InternationalTreaties, Agreements, and Conventions
This section highlights certain environmental treaties to
demonstrate the manner in which international agreements have

142.
Id.
143.
Id.
144.
William Prince & David Nelson, Developing an Environmental Model:
Piecing Together the Growing Diversity of InternationalEnvironmental Standardsand
Agendas Affecting Mining Companies, 7 COLO. J. INT'L. ENVTL. L. & POLY 247, 249

(1996).
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arguably contributed to the convergence of environmental liability
regimes in the United States, the European Community, and Japan.
Because there is often no enforcement mechanism supporting these
treaties, international cooperation and effective communication are
essential. The polluter pays principle, then, can be disseminated as a
fundamental principle underlying environmental liability policies in
this open forum of communication and treaty construction by leading
environmental nations like the United States. Consequently,
international environmental treaties have likely encouraged the
review and subsequent implementation of the polluter pays principle
in countries like the United States, those in the European
Community, and Japan as a result of the process by which
international treaties arise.
1. The Agreement Between the United States of America and the
United Mexican States on Cooperation for the Protection and
Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area (La Paz
Agreement)
The La Paz Agreement 145 establishes general goals for the
protection of the environment along the border of the United States
and Mexico. 146 The La Paz Agreement is a general outline of the
parties' administrative and cooperative efforts, which provide for
specific solutions to environmental problems to be resolved through
formal annexes when needed. 14 7 While the La Paz Agreement does
not expressly embrace the polluter pays principle, it does illustrate
the enormous influence that U.S. environmental policy exerts on its
foreign counterparts. Again, this influence can be expended to
encourage the use of the polluter pays principle as a remediation tool.
2. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (Basel Convention)
The primary concern of the Basel Convention 148 is to ensure that
the management of hazardous wastes, particularly the transboundary
movement and disposal of such wastes, promotes the protection of

145.
Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the
Environment in the Border Area, Aug. 14, 1983, U.S.-Mex., T.I.A.S. No. 10,827.
146.
147.

Id.
Id.

148.
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, S. DOC. NO. 102-5 (1991),
reprinted in 28 L.L.M. 657 [hereinafter Basel Convention]; see generally INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND REFERENCES (Edith Brown Weiss et al.

eds., 1992) (providing a collection of international environmental treaties and primary
sources).

20051

THE EMERGENCE OF THE POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE

565

human health and the environment to protect countries against the
uncontrolled dumping of toxic wastes. 149 The Basel Convention was
adopted on March 22, 1989, by 116 countries and the European
Economic Community. On May 5, 1992, pursuant to its ratification by
forty countries, the Basel Convention was executed and went into
effect.150

While the Basel Convention does not explicitly codify the polluter
pays principle, it does expressly support the general principles of
international environmental law, which do include the polluter pays
principle. 151 Again, because of the growing use of international
treaties as tools of articulating environmental policy, global
recognition of the polluter pays principle is a factor that certainly
encourages the United States, the European Community, and Japan
to incorporate the principle into their respective domestic
environmental liability regimes.
3.
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio
Declaration)
The Rio Declaration 152 arose out of the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development held in Brazil in 1992.
The Rio Declaration pursues broad principles of environmental
protection. Evidence of the emerging alignment of international
environmental regulatory processes, including use of the polluter
pays principle, is reflected in a few of the Rio Declaration's twenty
seven principles: Principle 10, which affords individuals the right to
have access to environmental information and to participate in
decision making; Principle 13, which demands that states develop
national liability and compensation laws directed at resolving injuries
attributable to polluters; Principle 16, which encourages states to
internalize environmental costs through the polluter pays principle;
and Principle 17, which demands that states establish a process for
153
assessing the environmental effects of proposed undertakings.
The Rio Declaration represents one of the more prominent
multilateral expressions of international support for the polluter pays
principle. It is important that the Declaration highlights some of the
environmental trends that this Note argues have encouraged the
adoption of the polluter pays principle: open access to information,
citizen participation, environmental assessments, and liability and

149.
Basel Convention, supra note 148, pmbl.
150.
Prince & Nelson, supra note 144, at 253.
David P. Fidler, Challenges to Humanity's Health: The Contributions of
151.
InternationalEnvironmental Law to National and Global Public Health, 31 ENVTL L.
REP. 10048, (Jan. 2001).

152.
153.

Rio Declaration,supra note 10.
Batt & Short, supra note 11, at 246-48.
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compensation schemes for pollution damage pursuant to the polluter
pays principle. 15 4 In sum, the Rio Declaration, like the La Paz
Agreement and the Basel Convention, reflects an emerging consensus
of international support for the polluter pays principle that likely
bears significantly on a country's decision to adopt the principle.
B. Availability of Information
The polluter pays principle is arguably a mainstay in U.S.,
European Community, and Japanese environmental liability regimes
because of the increasing availability of material information
155
Most
concerning effective environmental liability models as well.
notably, Canada, Japan, Australia, and many European countries
have structured their respective environmental liability regimes, and
have centered them on the polluter pays principle, by consulting the
environmental liability model of the United States. 156 Many
components of a developed nation's regulatory programs are available
either in hard copy, facsimile, in CD-ROM format, or via the
in nations
regulatory personnel
Internet. 15 7 Environmental
developing their regulatory models do access, "in an unprecedented
way," materials to inform their policy decisions. 158 Thus, the
emergence of globalized information networks that provide access to
environmental regulatory models and information is likely a factor
bearing on the decisions of developed nations, like those of the
European Community and Japan, to structure their respective
environmental liability regimes, at least in part, on the polluter pays
principle.
C. ExtraterritorialApplication of U.S. Environmental Laws
This section explores three aspects of U.S. law that also arguably
influence the development of environmental standards in the
European Community and Japan by regulating the activities of U.S.
companies abroad.

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Prince & Nelson, supra note 144, at 304.
Id. at 262.
Id. at 263.
Id. at 262.
Id. at 263.
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1. U.S. Environmental Laws
apply
laws
do
not
U.S.
environmental
Generally,
extraterritorially. Some scholars have asserted that the notion of
sovereignty makes it difficult, even undesirable, for a state to afford
its laws extraterritorial breadth. 159 Application of the National
Environmental Protection Act and the polluter pays principle to the
conduct of U.S. corporations abroad, as well as to U.S. foreign
military installations, however, is permissible because application of
U.S. laws to U.S. interests in foreign nations is not considered
extraterritorial. 160 Enforcing U.S. environmental laws abroad merely
constitutes the straightforward application of U.S. laws on facilities,
activities, and operations that are under substantial control by a U.S.
interest. 16 1 Consequently, the European Community and Japan have

observed the effectiveness of the polluter pays principle in
remediating environmental contamination on their own soil. 1 62 This
circumstance has arguably exerted tremendous influence on the
formation of environmental liability regimes in these countries,
thereby encouraging employment of the polluter pays principle.
2. Securities and Exchange Commission Environmental Disclosures
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) imposes
certain disclosure obligations through registration-statement and
requirements for companies registering
prospectus-disclosure
securities for sale or for issuance in business transactions under the
Securities Act of 1933, and through periodic and other reporting
requirements for companies under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.163 Again, because SEC disclosure requirements apply to the
activities of foreign subsidiaries, foreign governments and regulators
observe firsthand, within their own national boundaries, the
effectiveness and influence of the polluter pays principle in
eliminating environmental waste.
For instance, Regulation S-K requires that reporting companies
describe the scope of disclosure for certain information in documents
such as the company's registration for the offering of its securities
and a company's 10-K annual report. 16 4 Regulation S-K also requires
disclosure related to environmental matters. Item 101, titled

159.

273 (1993).
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

JAMIE CASSELS, THE UNCERTAIN PROMISE OF LAW: LESSONS FROM BHOPAL

Id.
Id.
See Prince & Nelson, supra note 144.
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa, 78a-7811 (1994).
17 C.F.R. § 229.10 (1993).
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"Description of Business," regulates the disclosure of the material
effects of compliance with environmental provisions. In part, Item
101 reads:
Appropriate disclosure also shall be made as to the material effects that
compliance with Federal, State and local provisions which have been
enacted or adopted regulating the discharge of materials into the
environment, or otherwise relating to the protection of the
environment, may have upon the capital expenditures, earnings and
165
competitive position of the registrant and its subsidiaries.

Item 103, titled "Legal Proceedings," requires the disclosure of
"any material pending legal proceedings, other than ordinary routine
litigation incidental to the business, to which the registrant or any of
its subsidiaries is a party or of which any of their property is the
166
subject."'
Item 303, titled "Management's Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results of Operations" (MD&A), is a set of
guidelines for disclosing liquidity, capital resources, results of
operations, and other information necessary to an understanding of a
registrant's financial condition, changes in financial condition, and
results of operations. 167 The SEC has issued an interpretive release to
determine MD&A disclosure obligations and to highlight Item 303's
168
application to environmental matters.
The SEC also comments on a reporting company's accounting
presentations pursuant to Regulation S-X, addressing the disclosure
of environmental contingencies in accounting presentations. 169 The
SEC currently requires that a reporting company independently
evaluate environmental liability expenditures and claims for
recovery.170
Again, foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations that remain
subject to the disclosure requirements of the SEC arguably sit as
experiments for foreign governments developing their environmental
liability regimes. As the SEC imposes and polices its requirements,
foreign regulators and policymakers observe the successes and
shortcomings of U.S. environmental regulation. Consequently, the
extraterritorial application of U.S. environmental laws likely exerts
significant influence on foreign regulators, including those in the

17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(xii) (1995).
165.
166.
17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (1995).
167.
17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (1995).
168.
Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results
of Operations, 54 Fed. Reg. 22427 (May 24, 1989); Prince & Nelson, supra note 144, at
268.
169
Prince & Nelson, supra note 144, at 269.
Id.
170.
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European Community and in Japan. As a result, the effectiveness
and efficiency of the polluter pays principle is highlighted firsthand.
D. Nongovernmental Organizations(NGOs)
As a result of the growing public activism and environmental
awareness among NGOs, 171 nations throughout Europe and Asia
have integrated the polluter pays principle into their environmental
agendas. 172 Throughout the 1990s, environmental NGOs with
substantial international and domestic influence developed highly
sophisticated legal support systems, captured the advantages of
information technologies, and marketed themselves and their
positions effectively. 17 3 One scholar has observed that "[t]he
international environmental movement is having a growing impact
on national and international politics, and there is little evidence to
suggest that the movement's momentum will slow in the near
74

future."1

NGOs often reference Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration,
asserting that the Principle formally empowers them as public
participants in environmental protection. 175 NGOs are increasingly
empowered by a number of other sources as well. For instance, the
World Bank allows for NGO participation, as do most multilateral
development agencies. 176 If potential borrowers resist the disclosure
of environmental impact assessments to NGOs, the Bank and other
development agencies often withdraw from any further participation
17 7
in the project.
As highlighted in subsection B above, information is the source
of NGO power, and NGOs are using available information in
''unprecedented and extraordinarily effective ways" to promote
environmental interests, including the polluter pays principle. 178 For
instance, NGOs have access to substantial information concerning a

171.
NGOs are scientific, professional, business, or public interest organizations,
which are neither affiliated with, or under the direction of, a government. See, e.g.,
Prince & Nelson, supra note 144, at 276 (describing the power sources and agendas of
environmental NGOs).
172.
See id. at 277 ("At the international level, NGOs are growing in number,
constituencies, and influence.").
173.
Id. at 276.
174.
Sheldon Kamieniecki, Emerging Forces in Global Environmental Politics,
in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA: MOVEMENTS, PARTIES,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND POLICY 3 (Sheldon Kamieniecki ed., 1993).

175.
See Batt & Short, supra note 11, at 246 (Principle 10 gives individuals the
right at the nation-state level to have access to environmental information, thus
allowing people to intelligently participate in decision making.).
176.
Prince & Nelson, supra note 144, at 278.
177.
Id.
178.
See id. ("Information is the source of NGO power.").
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company's worldwide environmental policies.179 NGOs consult
reporting companies' SEC disclosures, as addressed in subsection C
above, and often hyperlink to U.S. SEC EDGAR files on their
homepages so that an inquirer may review SEC-required
environmental disclosures of publicly held companies.1 8 0
This empowerment via access to information has allowed NGOs
to move from merely articulating environmental policy to that of
formulating and implementing policy. 18 1 Arguably, therefore, the
of NGOs in the development of
increasing participation
environmental liability regimes has played an equally significant role
in encouraging and demanding the adoption of the polluter pays
principle as a remedial tool to combat pollution in the United States,
the European Community, and Japan.
E. Bilateraland MultilateralDevelopment Institutions
International investments are increasingly tied to bilateral and
multilateral lending and insurance requirements, which often require
environmental evaluation and protective investments in the project,
as well as environmental covenants in the loan and insurance
package.' 8 2 Many of these lending arrangements include covenants
requiring adoption of the polluter pays principle to remedy any
environmental problems that arise from use of the lending
proceeds.' 8 3 Consequently, proliferation of the polluter pays principle
as an effective tool for environmental waste remediation is promoted
by development institutions around the world as well.
In February 1980, the principal development banks adopted a
policy statement on the need for environmental protection
considerations in a project titled, "Multilateral Development Banks'
Declaration on Environmental Policies and Procedures Relating to
Economic Development.' 8 4 Since 1980, the major multilateral and

179.
180.
181.

Id. at 279.
Id.
Id.; see also A. Dan Tarlock, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations

in the Development of International Environmental Law, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 61, 63

(1992) ("NGOs became permanent players in the regulatory game with the capacity to
influence all phases of policy, and NGO participation in law making has now become a
political theory.").
Prince & Nelson, supra note 144, at 279.
182.
Id.
183.
Declaration of Environmental Policies and Procedures Relating to
184.
Economic Development, Feb. 1, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 524. Signatories were the African
Development Bank, the Arab Bank for Economic Development, the Asian Development
Bank, the Caribbean Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the
World Bank, the Commission of the European Communities, the Organization of
American States, the United Nations Development Programme, and the United
Nations Environment Program. Id.
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bilateral development institutions have developed and adopted
environmental policies and procedures.1 8 5 Two examples highlight
the importance that bilateral and multilateral development
institutions have played in the emergence of the polluter pays
principle as a core facet of environmental liability regimes in the
United States, the European Community, and Japan.
1, The World Bank
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
generically referred to as the World Bank, is headquartered in
Washington, D.C. The International Finance Corporation (IFC), the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, and the International
Development Association, together with the World Bank, comprise
the World Bank Group. The World Bank's environmental
requirements are described in a three volume series called the
Sourcebook. 186 The Sourcebook emphasizes the attention to be given
to major projects that have the potential to generate negative
environmental effects. 187 The World Bank's assessment policy
provides that "[t]he purpose of Environmental Assessments is to
ensure that the development options under consideration are
environmentally sound and sustainable, and that any environmental
consequences are recognized early in the project cycle and taken into
account in project design."' 8 8
Considering the developments in environmental technology,
regulatory and institutional development, and scientific advances, the
World Bank is interested in providing the most relevant review
procedures possible. 189 These procedures now include consideration of
the host country's environmental waste remediation standards, with
an emphasis on the adoption of the polluter pays principle as a factor
bearing on a favorable review. 190 Furthermore, as highlighted in
subsection D above, the World Bank is lobbied with increasing
success by sophisticated NGOs that often require adherence to the
Polluter Pays principle as the chief mechanism for site
remediation. 19 1 And, because most, if not all, multilateral and

185.
Prince & Nelson, supra note 144, at 280.
Policies, Procedures, and Cross-Sectoral Issue, TP-139, in 1 WORLD BANK
186.
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT SOURCEBOOK (1991); Sectoral Guidelines, YP-140, in 2
WORLD BANK

ENVIRONMENTAL

ASSESSMENT SOURCEBOOK

(1991);

Guidelines for

Environmental Assessment of Energy and Industry Projects, in 3 WORLD BANK
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT SOURCEBOOK (1991).

187.

Prince & Nelson, supra note 144, at 280.

188.
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DIRECTIVE (1989).
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Prince & Nelson, supra note 144, at 281.
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bilateral lending and insurance institutions benchmark their
environmental standards against those used by the World Bank, host
countries petitioning for lending and insurance services are
confronted in every direction with adoption of the polluter pays
192
principle.
Consequently, the polluter pays principle has grown in
popularity as an effective tool for environmental site remediation
because those nations that participate in the financing process
through monetary contributions and project administration (i.e., the
United States, Member States of the European Community, and
Japan) often support the tenets of the lending process and formulate
their domestic environmental policies accordingly.
2. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation
The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) is a forprofit agency of the U.S. government that finances various projects
throughout the world. 193 OPIC's mandate is to facilitate economically
productive and environmentally sound U.S. private investment in
194
OPIC
developing countries and emerging free market economies.
currently operates in 140 countries, including the Member States of
the European Community and Japan. 195 Because of OPIC capital
available for investment in economies around the world, the
governments of many potential beneficiaries likely adjust their
environmental policies accordingly to attract capital infusion, which
arguably includes adoption of the polluter pays principle.
Since 1995, OPIC has been subject to Section 117 of the U.S.
Foreign Assistance Act, 196 which requires OPIC to "prepare and take
fully into account an environmental assessment of any proposed
program or project under this chapter significantly affecting the
environment of any foreign country."'1 9 7 OPIC's environmental review
requires understanding the process involved in the proposed project,
waste material produced, waste treatment and disposal method,
worker health and safety standards, citing issues, host country
environmental requirements, and overall short- and long-term

192.
Id.
193.
Id. at 284.
194.
Id. at 284-85.
195.
Id. at 281.
196.
Exec. Order No. 12,114, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1979), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321
(1994 & Supp. 1996).
197.
Id.
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environmental effect. 198 Furthermore, OPIC strongly considers the
position of relevant NGOs in rendering their investment decisions. 199
The mere violation of environmental requirements can put an OPIC
loan in technical default. 200 Thus, because OPIC investments must
comply with World Bank standards, and because World Bank
standards often require use of the polluter pays principle, the
prevalence of OPIC participation in financing projects around the
world has likely increased the awareness of the principle as an
important environmental remediation tool in the European
Community and Japan.
F. Standardizationof EnvironmentalPolicies Worldwide
Various industry practices, policies, and guidelines have evolved
into recognized international environmental standards. 20 1 This
section describes one of these practices, as well as its influence on the
proliferation of the polluter pays principle, as a mechanism for
achieving efficient remediation of environmental waste.
1. ISO 9000/14000
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) was
organized in 1947 to encourage the development of standardization to
facilitate the efficient exchange of goods and services. 20 2 In 1987, the
ISO published a series of quality standards known as the ISO 9000
Series that have been adopted in more than seventy countries and are
the most widely accepted product quality standards worldwide. 20 3 In
1991, the ISO formed the Strategic Advisory Group on the
Environment (SAGE) to review the adoption of standardized
environmental management practices as well. 20 4 Based on the SAGE
review, the ISO established Technical Committee 207 (TC 207) to
20 5
establish new standards for environmental management systems.
TC 207 was later designated as the ISO 14000 Series, and it has
worked on developing international environmental standards in six
systems,
environmental
environmental
management
areas:
performance evaluation, environmental auditing, environmental
20 6
labeling, life cycle analysis, and terms and definitions.

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
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Prince & Nelson, supranote 144, at 286.
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Id. at 287.
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 291.
Id.
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The ISO 14000 was partly catalyzed by the proliferation of
different environmental standards worldwide. 20 7 As a consequence of
the external pressures addressed in this section, these different
environmental standards have, to a significant extent, been
eliminated by the convergence of environmental policies among
leading economic nations. In particular, the United States, Member
States of the European Community, and Japan have developed and
adopted the polluter pays principle as a core component of their
country's environmental liability regimes. For instance, the American
National Standards Institute, which is the U.S. representative before
208
the ISO, has historically encouraged the polluter pays principle.
Similarly, the European Union had adopted as its environmental
management tool the European Eco-Management and Audit Scheme
for Member States, which also promotes the advantages of the
20 9
polluter pays principle.
In sum, international treaties, the increasing availability of
material information concerning the environment, domestic and
foreign laws, nongovernmental
organizations, bilateral
and
multilateral
development
institutions,
and
the
growing
standardization of environmental policies worldwide have greatly
contributed to the adoption and proliferation of the polluter pays
principle in the United States, the European Community, and Japan.

V.

CONCLUSION

International environmental agendas, practices, standards, and
treaties are becoming more and more prevalent globally. As this Note
illustrates, it is a challenge to read a law review article addressing
environmental liability without also reading about NGOs, and to read
about NGOs without also reading about multilateral lending and
development practices, and to read about multilateral lending
practices without also coming across the ease with which information
can be discovered, and so on. These elements, as well as the others
addressed in this Note, are arguably informing an environmental
model that greatly influences regulatory bodies at the international,
domestic, and local levels.
Adoption of the polluter pays principle in the United States, in
the European Community, and in Japan is tremendously important
because economically advanced countries often exert positive
pressure on developing countries through project finance,

207.
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international treaties, and foreign relations generally. Because the
polluter pays principle has proved productive and efficient in these
countries, the principle, and the support for a cleaner environment,
can be encouraged through their efforts with developing countries as
well.
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